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NOTES
Constitutional Law: A New Suspect Class: A Final
Reprieve for Homosexuals in the Military?
The Army's policy concerning homosexuals is and has been one of in-
tolerance. Homosexuals, considered unfit for military service, are not per-
mitted to serve in the armed forces in any capacity.' Homosexuality is con-
sidered by the military a severe character defect which lessens the efficiency
of these individuals to function in society.
2
Recognition of the homosexual option as a legitimate and alternative way
of life is the major goal of the gay rights movement. 3 In furthering their fight
to gain acknowledgment, perhaps in no other area has progress been so percep-
tible as the military. No substantial results, however, can be expected in this
area until homosexuals receive statutory or judicial protection as a class.'
In Watkins v. United States,5 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rendered a landmark decision establishing homosexuals as a suspect class. By
doing so, the appellate court expanded the groups which can receive suspect
class status, a status which insures constitutional protection of their rights.
6
The Ninth Circuit's decision was rendered after Perry Watkins, a military career
man, claimed Army regulations discriminated against him as an admitted
homosexual. 7 The regulations in question mandated that all homosexuals be
discharged from the service and that they not be allowed to re-enlist. 8
Watkins challenged the Army's regulations on several statutory and con-
stitutional grounds. One claim stated that the regulations denied him equal
protection of the laws in violation of the fifth amendment.' Upon discharge,
1. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 921, discussed in C. WILUmis & M. WIENBERG, HOmOSEXUALS ANJD THE
MrITwy 24 (1971).
2. Id.
3. Rice, Legalizing Homosexual Conduct: The Role of the Supreme Court in the Gay Rights
Movement 2 (Constitutional Commentary No. 1, Center for Judicial Studies, 1984).
4. McCrary & Gutierrez, The Homosexual Person in the Military and in National Security
Employment, 5 J. oF HoMosExuALrY 115, 140 (1979-80).
5. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (hereinafter Watkins III).
6. Id. at 1352.
7. Id. at 1335.
8. Army Regulation 635-200, ch. 15, effective July 1984.
9. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1335. An equal protection claim can be correctly based on the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. The fifth amendment contains a due process
clause. As for equality, the fifth amendment also seeks the same end as the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The concept of equal justice under the law is served by
both clauses. Each forbids unequal government action, so there is an equal protection aspect
of the due process clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); B. ScHwARTz, CoNrsTrru-
TioNAL LAW 362 (1979).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Watkins joined a long list of homosexual military personnel seeking equal
treatment under the law.'
0
This note will advocate that Watkins v. United States has embodied the
appropriate and necessary doctrine for furthering the equal protection of
homosexuals. First, the factual background of the Watkins case and how it
came before the Ninth Circuit must be examined. Second, the analysis will
turn to several equal protection tests, standards of review, and the court's
application of these tests to groups recognized as suspect classes. In the third
section, the concern will focus on the major cases, including Bowers v. Hard-
wick," upon which the Army based its argument. The Army claimed these
cases foreclosed Watkins' claim of constitutional violation.
The fourth section will examine the Ninth Circuit's application of the equal
protection analysis to Watkins. This will include an examination of the reason-
ing behind the court's recognizing homosexuals as a suspect class. Finally,
the military's justifications for its regulations will be surveyed and proven
to be constitutionally unwarranted.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of homosexuals as a suspect class was correct.
Only by allowing homosexuals to be a suspect class can such individuals be
afforded equal protection guaranteed to all under the fifth amendment.
Watkins v. United States
In 1967, nineteen-year-old Perry Watkins enlisted in the United States Ar-
my. When completing the Army's medical preinduction form, Watkins'
answered "yes" to a query concerning his homosexual tendencies. Nonetheless,
the Army inducted him into its ranks.' 2 Again in 1968, Watkins admitted
to the Army that he was a homosexual and he had engaged in sodomy with
two other servicemen. Such an act was a military crime, punishable by court
martial under military law.'
3
Upon those admissions, several criminal investigations were conducted into
Watkins' sexual conduct. Due to insufficient evidence, the investigations were
dropped. Watkins was repeatedly allowed to re-enlist even though his homosex-
uality was known."
Finally, in 1975 an Army board convened in order to determine whether
Watkins should be discharged because he had admitted his preference for
homosexuality. During this investigation, Watkins' commanding officer
testified that Watkins' homosexuality had not affected his service in the Ar-
my and that his performance had been exemplary. The board found that
10. See also Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985); benShalom v. Secretary of
the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1980); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80
(9th Cir. 1981).
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
12. Watkins I1, 847 F.2d at 1330.





Watkins was suitable for retention in the service because no evidence indicated
his behavior had affected his unit or his job performance."
In 1977, the Army granted Watkins a security clearance for information
classified as "Secret." Because Watkins had admitted his homosexuality, the
security clearance had initially been rejected. Watkins' commanding officer
again testified to his outstanding professional attitude. Upon an Army physi-
cian's determination that Watkins' homosexuality had no effect on his work,
the decision was reversed.' 6
After working without incident until 1979, the Army revoked Watkins'
security clearance based on his latest admission of homosexuality. However,
in 1979 Watkins was allowed to re-enlist.'
7
In 1981, the Army promulgated a new regulation which mandated that all
homosexuals be discharged, regardless of merit. A new Army board recom-
mended that Watkins be discharged from the service and denied re-enlistment
based solely on his homosexual admissions." Before the actual discharge was
issued, the district court enjoined the Army from discharging Watkins on the
basis of double jeopardy.'9
Subsequently, however, the Army denied Watkins' application to re-enlist.
Nevertheless, the district court again enjoined the Army from denying his
right to re-enlist. Watkins' re-enlistment application was approved, but he was
warned that the re-enlistment would be voided if the district court's injunction
was not upheld on appeal.
20
While the Army's appeal was pending, Watkins was rated on his perfor-
mance and professionalism by the Army. He received outstanding ratings and
was recommended for promotion by his evaluators.
2'
The district court's injunction was reversed on appeal,22 and the case was
remanded. The appellate court reasoned that the federal courts could not order
the military to violate their own regulations without a showing that the regula-
tions were unconstitutional.
23
On remand, the district court held that the regulations were constitutional
and granted summary judgment to the Army. Watkins appealed to the Ninth
Circuit. 24 Finding the Army regulations unconstitutional, the court of appeals
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1332.
18. Id.
19. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 541 F. Supp. 249, 259 (W.D. Wash. 1982). The district court
held that the evidence could not support a finding that Watkins engaged in homosexual conduct
before the 1975 discharge proceeding. The Army's double jeopardy provision barred the Army
from basing Watkins' discharge on statements that just repeated what Watkins had stated in
the 1975 discharge proceedings. The statements merely reaffirmed that Watkins was a homosexual.
Id.
20. Watkins v. United States Army, 551 F. Supp. 212, 223 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
21. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1333.
22. Watkins v. United States Army, 721 F.2d 687, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1983).
23. Id.
24. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1334.
1989]
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established homosexuals as a suspect class. As a result, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's rulings.2
An Analysis of Watkins' Constitutional Claims
Only one of Watkins' five claims survived the court of appeals' scrutiny.
Watkins first argued that the Army's regulations were arbitrary and capricious
under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act.26 The court re-
jected this argument because Watkins had not claimed the rationale for the
Army's regulations was arbitrary and capricious. He claimed only that the
Army's actions in discharging him and denying him re-enlistment were in viola-
tion of the act.
27
Watkins also claimed that by discharging him and denying him re-enlist-
ment, the Army violated his freedom of speech as guaranteed by the first
amendment. Watkins argued these actions constituted due process entrapment
because the Army had induced him to believe that his homosexuality would
not disqualify him from the Army.28 The court concluded that the Army's
determination of Watkins' homosexuality was based on his own admissions
concerning sexual preferences and his 1968 admission that he had engaged
in homosexual acts. The regulations warrant that homosexual acts give rise
to a presumption of homosexuality.29
In the appellate court's words "under the regulations, any homosexual who
engages in homosexual acts is automatically disqualified from service."' 0 After
Watkins' 1968 admission that he had engaged in homosexual acts, he was
presumed to have a homosexual orientation. He could not rebut that presump-
tion, because Watkins' orientation was in fact homosexual. Regardless whether
he had ever stated he had homosexual tendencies, the regulations mandated
his discharge and denial of re-enlistment.' 1 Therefore, Watkins' claim could
not stand unless he could show that the regulations Which discharge those
who engage in homosexual acts are invalid.
32
Watkins recognized that he was foreclosed from his due process claim 3"
by the ruling laid down in Bowers v. Hardwick.3' As a result, the court was
left to determine whether the Army's regulations denied Watkins equal pro-
tection of the laws, violating his fifth amendment rights.3 Watkins argued
25. Id. at 1352.
26. Id. at 1334.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1335. See also Army Regulation 635-200, ch. 15-2.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 1334.
34. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
35. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution states in relevant part that "no





that the Army's regulations constituted invidious discrimination against sex-
ual orientation."
Evolution of Equal Protection
Pursuant to the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution, no government official, agent or entity may deprive any person
of the equal protection of the laws." Modern equal protection has two
branches: the "fundamental" rights branch and the branch which disapproves
of governmental action subject to levels of scrutiny and suspect classes.3" First,
the proper standard of judicial review must be identified.
The traditional standard, rational basis, is normally used to test the con-
stitutionality of economic and social legislation. As the least stringent of the
applicable standards, the rational basis test requires only that the discrimina-
tion bear "some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.""
At the other end of the spectrum, the strict scrutiny standard will only uphold
a discriminatory legislative classification if it is necessary to accomplish a "com-
pelling state interest." 4 This test is appropriate if the statute discriminates
against a "suspect class"'" or violates a specially protected constitutional
right." The justification most often advanced for the special treatment of
a legislative classification is the need to protect "discrete and insular minorities"




Since 1970, an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny has developed. 44 This
standard, often called rational basis "with a bite," is found in cases where
the classification is close to being "suspect," or the interest in question,
although not held to be fundamental, is still very important. 4 This intermediate
level of review requires that a statute which discriminates must be struck down
unless it is shown to be substantially related to an important state goal.
46
Race, the model paradigm of suspect class analysis, is often joined by
alienage and national origin as the only three suspect classes recognized by
36. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1335.
37. U.S. CON T. amend. V (the due process clause) and the fourteenth amendment.
38. P. PoLYVOU, EQUAL PROTECTIONOF Tm LAWS 79 (1980).
39. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
40. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
41. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
42. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
43. U.S. v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In Justice Stone's famous
footnote, he remarked that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may tend to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities and
... may call for a more searching judicial scrutiny."
44. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). New equal protection, or the advent of the
intermediate scrutiny test, was basically a product of the Warren Court. The doctrine received
its first comprehensive interpretation in the Shapiro case.
45. Polyviou, supra note 38, at 182. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
46. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
19891
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the United States Supreme Court.47 The intermediate standard is most often
applied to gender and illegitimacy cases, or quasi-suspect classifications.
When deciding whether homosexuals constituted a suspect class, the ap-
pellate court first looked at several relevant factors essential to a suspect class
inquiry. If evidence existed that homosexuals fit these factors, a suspect class
would be found. In that case, strict scrutiny would automatically be applied
to the Army regulations.49 Those relevant factors include immutable
characteristics, highly visible characteristics, historical disadvantage and relative
lack of political representation.50
Bowers Distinguished
Before the court in Watkins applied equal protection analysis, it chose to
address the Army's argument that existing precedent foreclosed the Ninth Cir-
cuit from addressing the issue.5 ' The Army first argued that the Supreme
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick" prevented Watkins from making
an equal protection claim.53 In Bowers, the Court held that homosexuals have
no fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy. Specifically, the Court
found that the right to privacy did not extend to acts of consensual homosex-
ual sodomy.54 The Court's holding was limited to one due process question.
Whether homosexuals were a suspect class was never addressed."
In Watkins, the Army argued that it would be inconsistent to find their
regulations discriminatory after the Hardwick decision. 6 The court addressed
the Army's claim by noting that nothing in Hardwick implied that a state
may penalize homosexuals for their sexual orientation."1 Also, Hardwick was
silent as to whether a state may make injurious distinctions when regulating
sexual conduct."'
The Army also argued that Hardwick's concern about the limits of the
Supreme Court's role in carrying out its constitutional mandate 9 should pro-
hibit courts from applying equal protection doctrine to protect homosexuals.
47. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 440 (1985). Classifications based
on race and national origin have been held to be suspect, and as such, are given special judicial
protection. Id. Alienage is also sometimes considered to be a suspect classification, unless the
case involves the "political function" exception. See 163 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 714 (1985).
48. Polyviou, supra note 38, at 239. See also Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Court
applying intermediate standard of equal protection analysis to gender); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456
U.S. 91 (1982) (Court applying intermediate equal protection standard to illegitimacy and find-
ing that it constituted a quasi-suspect class).
49. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1345.
50. 163 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 714 (1985).
51. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1339.
52. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
53. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1339.
54. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
55. Id.
56. Watkins Ill, 847 F.2d at 1340.
57. Id.
58. Id.




The Hardwick court seemed particularly concerned with the problems allegedly
created when judges recognize constitutional rights not expressly stated in the
Constitution, and having little or no recognizable ties to the language of the
Constitution.6"
The Watkins court recognized that the right to equal protection had a clear
foundation in the United States Constitution.6' Indeed, the framers of the
fourteenth amendment understood it to be a broadly worded injunction. The
amendment could be interpreted by future generations in accordance with the
vision and needs of those generations. Accordingly, the equal protection clause
could be construed the same way. 2
The Army also relied on Belier v. Middendorf,'63 Hatheway v. Secretary
of the Army," and DeSantis v. Pacific Telegraph and Telephone Co. 65 In
reviewing those cases, the Ninth Circuit found all three decisions unpersuasive
or inapplicable." Because Watkins claimed only that the Army regulations
discriminated against him because he was homosexual,"' his assertion was not
barred by precedent. The next step was to subject Watkins' claims to equal
protection analysis. 6"
Applying Equal Protection Analysis to Watkins
The Watkins court engaged in a three-stage inquiry when deciding whether
the Army regulations had in fact denied Watkins of equal protection." First,
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 218 (1970) (Harlan).
63. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980). Beller, like Bowers, was a substan-
tive due process case and therefore not applicable precedent. Watkins 111, 847 F.2d at 1342.
Courts use substantive due process to review the government's ability to restrict the freedom
of action of all persons. Equal protection analysis is used to review governmentally established
classification. In Justice Kennedy's opinion, he made a clear statement that Beller was not presented
to the court as involving the creation of a suspect class. Beller, 632 F.2d at 807.
64. Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit
also found that Hatheway was not controlling in Watkins IIL Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1343.
The claim in Hatheway stated that the Army was prosecuting cases involving homosexual sodomy,
but not heterosexual sodomy. The claim rested on the fundamental rights branch of equal pro-
tection doctrine. This inquiry concerned whether a governmental classification burdens a fun-
damental right. The court applied intermediate scrutiny to the Army's actions and found that
selective prosecutions were permissible. Hatheway at 1382. As a result, the court rejected Hatheway's
claim based on the fundamental rights branch of the equal protection doctrine, the branch on
which Watkins did not rely. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1343.
65. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). The Army contended
that the Ninth Circuit in DeSantis had already determined that homosexuals do not constitute
a suspect class. Even though the court's observation turned in part on the idea that courts have
not designated homosexuals a suspect class, the Ninth Circuit in DeSantis did not affirmatively
hold that homosexuals were in fact a suspect group. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 333.
66. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1345. (court concluding that no federal appellate court had
decided the critical claim raised by Watkins).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1335.
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the court determined whether the regulations discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation."0 Second, the court determined which level of judicial
scrutiny applied to sexual orientation discrimination. Finally, the court deter-
mined whether the challenged regulations could survive the applicable level
of scrutiny.7 '
To determine whether the regulations were in fact discriminatory, the court
looked at both the re-enlistment and discharge regulations concerning homo-
sexuals . 7 A portion of the re-enlistment regulation stated that applicants would
be denied re-enlistment if they had a history of homosexuality." This included
persons who had merely admitted to be homosexuals, even though no evidence
had been presented that they had engaged in homosexual acts either before
or during military service. Additionally, the regulation denied re-enlistment
to persons who had committed homosexual acts. However, if the homosexual
acts were in an isolated episode, stemming from curiosity, intoxication or im-
maturity, those persons would not be denied reenlistment.""
The Army regulation which mandated discharge was similar to the re-enlist-
ment portion. 7 The court concluded that on their face the regulations did
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1336.
72. Id.
73. Army Regulation 601-280, 2-21 states in relevant part that:
Applicants to whom the disqualifications below apply are ineligible for reenlist-
ment at any time and requests for waiver or exception to policy will not be submitted
c. Persons of questionable moral character and a history of antisocial behavior,
sexual perversion or homosexuality. A person who has committed homosexual acts
or is an admitted homosexual but as to whom there is no evidence that they have
engaged in homosexual acts either before or during military service is included.
k. Persons being discharged under AR 635-200 for homosexuality ...
Note: Persons who have been involved in homosexual acts in an apparently isolated
episode, stemming solely from immaturity, curiosity, or intoxication, and in the
absence of other evidence that the person is a homosexual, normally will not be
excluded from reenlistment. A homosexual is a person who desires bodily contact
between persons of the same sex, actively undertaken or passively permitted, with
the intent to obtain or give sexual gratification. Any official, private, or public
profession of homosexuality, may be considered in determining whether a person
is an admitted homosexual.
74. Id.
75. Army Regulation 635-200 provides in relevant part that:
15-2 Definitions ...
a. Homosexual means a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
b. Bisexual means a person who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends
to engage in homosexual or heterosexual acts.
c. A homosexual act means bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between soldiers of the same sex for sexual satisfaction.
15-3 Criteria
The basis for separations may include preservice, prior service, or current service
conduct or statements. A soldier will be separated per this chapter if one or more
of the following approved findings is made:
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss2/4
NOTES
discriminate against homosexuals on the basis of sexual orientation. Accord-
ing to the regulations, a serviceman who had engaged in any homosexual act
or who had made a statement admitting homosexuality raised the presump-
tion of a homosexual orientation. Unless one was able to rebut the presump-
tion, he was forbidden from joining the Army.
Essentially, the regulations targeted homosexual orientation itself rather than
homosexual activity. Acts and statements would be mere relevant indicators
of that orientation.
7 6
Therefore, the ultimate determination was whether the applicant had a
homosexual orientation. As to the confessions of homosexuality, the regula-
tions did not penalize all statements of sexual desire, or only those of homosex-
ual desire. The regulations penalized only statements of homosexual orienta-
tion made by homosexuals."
One important point is that persons could still qualify for service in the
Army, despite their past homosexual conduct, if they could prove to the Army
that their orientation was heterosexual, not homosexual. The regulation did
not apply to heterosexual soldiers who were involved in any homosexual acts
in an apparently isolated episode."
The Watkins court offered the example that if a homosexual soldier and
a heterosexual soldier of the same sex engage in homosexual acts because they
were drunk, the heterosexual soldier may remain in the Army while the
homosexual soldier would be discharged. 79 The Army regulations dictated this
result because the heterosexual soldier's act stemmed from an isolated episode
of drunkeness. He would be able to rebut the presumption of homosexuality
on that basis. The homosexual soldier would be unable to rebut the presump-
tion because his orientation was in fact homosexual.
Essentially, the regulations penalized soldiers who had engaged in homo-
sexual acts only when the Army concluded that those soldiers were actually
a. The soldier has engaged in, attempted to engage, or solicited another to engage
in a homosexual act unless there are further approved findings that-
(1) Such conduct is a departure from the soldier's usual and customary behavior;
and
(2) Such conduct is unlikely to recur because it is shown, for example, that
the act occurred because of immaturity, intoxication, coercion, or a desire to avoid
military service and
(3) Such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimida-
tion by the soldier during a period of military service; and
(4) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the soldier's continued
presence in the Army is consistent with the interest of the Army in proper discipline,
good order, and morale; and
(5) The soldier does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in homosexual
acts.
76. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1337.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1338.
79. Id. at 1339.
1989]
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gay. 80 Under that analysis, the court determined that the regulations burdened
persons of homosexual orientation.'
Next, the Watkins court applied the relevant factors to determine if homosex-
uals constituted a suspect class. These factors included the class' historical
disadvantage, the class' immutable characteristics and a cluster of other traits.
The first factor involved whether the class had been subjected to a disadvan-
tage historically. Presence of a historical disadvantage would indicate that
the class had been the victim of discrimination. 2
Historically, homosexuals have been subjected to prolonged hostility. 3 Fre-
quently victims of violence, homosexuals have been banned from schools,
churches, housing, jobs and even families. 4 More recently, in High Tech Gays
v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,8 the same harsh truth was
echoed. In High Tech Gays, the federal district court concluded that "les-
bians and gays have been the object of some of the deepest prejudice and
hatred in American society."
86
The court in Watkins determined that the discrimination faced by homosex-
uals was comparable to the discrimination faced by other groups treated as
suspect classes. These classes include aliens or people of a particular national
origin.
87
The second factor concerned a cluster of highly visible characteristics. In
applying this concept, the court applied three sublevels of inquiry. These levels
include: (1) whether the disadvantaged class was defined by a trait that "fre-
quently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society;"'
(2) whether the class has been encumbered with unique disabilities because
of inaccurate stereotypes and prejudices; and (3) whether the trait defining
the class was immutable.89
These levels of inquiry were used to determine whether the discrimination
incorporated a gross unfairness. If affirmative evidence existed as to each
inquiry, the case for discrimination became more concrete. Such inequality
must be sufficiently inconsistent with equal protection goals to determine if
it is invidious.9'
Plainly, no nexus exists between a person's sexual orientation and that
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 441 (1985).
83. C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, HoMosExuA.S AND THE MILrrARY 24, 25 (1971).
84. Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection: Heightened Scrutiny to
Classification Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 824-25 (1984). See also Dronenburg
v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (naval officer discharged on grounds of private homosexual
activity); Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39 (1975) (lesbian mother denied custody).
85. 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
86. Id.
87. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1345.
88. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 686 (1973).
89. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 440-44 (1985).




person's success as a teacher, parent, citizen or soldier. 9' Indeed, in Watkins
the Army did not claim that homosexuality impairs a person's job perform-
ance. A review of Watkins' exemplary military record attested to quite the
opposite.9 2 The Army itself found no evidence that Watkins' homosexuality
had a degenerating effect upon the unit's performance, discipline, morale,
or upon his own job performance. 93 The inapplicability of sexual orientation
to a person's success in society also implies that prejudice and inaccurate
stereotypes are inherent in classifications based on sexual orientation.94
The Army justified its regulations in part on the basis that prejudice against
homosexuals was so pervasive that their presence in the Army would taint
the Army's image and deter enlistment. 9 The Army also justified its regula-
tions as reflecting public opinion against persons who engage in immoral acts.
96
The Watkins court held that the regulations burdened the class defined by
sexual orientation, and the court recognized that homosexual orientation was
not a crime. The Army's premise could not stand.
9 7
In fact, the regulations discriminated against all persons of homosexual orien-
tation, regardless of whether they had committed sodomy. 9 Sodomy, the only
consensual adult sexual conduct criminalized by Congress,99 was the only form
of homosexual conduct found to be illegal."0 The Army regulations covered
many other forms of homosexual conduct aside from sodomy which were
not criminal. 10' The Army's regulations might have been justified if the class
they discriminated against was comprised of only sodomists. The Watkins
court determined that this was not the case. 10 2 The evidence which indicated
that Watkins had engaged in any act of sodomy was inconclusive, yet the
regulations mandated his discharge.1
3
Another indicator of a suspect class determination concerns immutable
characteristics as a consideration of gross unfairness. The Supreme Court is
willing to treat a trait as immutable if it was determined by causes not within
the individual's control.'04 Immutability is described as those traits that are
91. Farrell, Equality, Classifications and Irrelevant Characteristics, 12 VT. L. REv. 11, 53 (1987).
92. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1331-33.
93. Id. at 1346.
94. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 440-41 (1985).




99. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1956). Article 125 deals with sodomy generally. It includes a procedure
for court-martial and provides for punishment of up to sixteen years of hard labor upon conviction.
100. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1347.
101. Army Regulation 635-200, ch. 15-2(a).
102. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1347. The class banned from the Army was not composed of
sodomists or homosexual sodomists. The class was composed of persons of homosexual orienta-
tion whether or not they had committed sodomy. The record in Watkins shows that the Army
had no proof that Watkins ever engaged in any act of sodomy.
103. Id. at 1332-33.
104. Id. at 1347. An example of an immutable characteristic is eye color.
1989]
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so inherent in a person's identity that it would be irrational for the govern-
ment to penalize a person for an unwillingness to change them. 03
Scientific research has determined that sexual orientation is largely immune
to change.' 0 ' Sexual orientation as a trait thus plays an important role in a
person's self-perception, group affiliation and identification by others. Under
this explanation of immutability, sexual orientation would join race and sex
as one of few characteristics that have such an intense impact on these three
aspects of personhood.' °7 The court concluded that sexual orientation falls
under the scope of an immutable trait. 0 8
The final factor to be considered in suspect class analysis is whether the
burdened group lacks political representation. 10 9 When evaluating whether a
class is politically underrepresented, the Supreme Court has focused on whether
the class is a "discrete and insular minority.""10
Most people rarely encounter homosexuals,"' or those they do encounter
seek to hide their sexual orientation. Thus, people have little exposure to
homosexuals." 2 Because of this, many people, including elected officials, have
difficulty understanding or empathizing with homosexuals.' Indeed, the most
blatant examples of discrimination against homosexuals have been enacted
by state legislatures and Congress. The fact that these discriminatory laws
still exist is evidence of the lack of homosexuals' political power."' 4 Pervasive
discrimination against homosexuals has seriously impaired their ability to gain
a politically viable voice for their views in state and local legislatures and
in Congress."'
Even when homosexuals can overcome this prejudice, general animosity
towards homosexuals makes their participation totally ineffective." 6 Coupled
105. Id. see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER DicONARY 352 (3d ed. 1974) (defining immutability as
"unchangeable, unchanging."); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (opinion of
Brennan, J.) ("sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined sole-
ly by the accident of birth ... ").
106. Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection: Heightened Scrutiny to
Classification Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV, at 817-21. See also Warren, Homosex-
uality and Stigma, HoMosExuAL BEHA IOR: MODERN REAPPRAISAL 123, 125-26 (1980); R.
KRoNEMEYER, OVERCOMING HoMosExuALrry 195 (1980) (homosexuality is not a choice); Baker
v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (citing evidence that "sexual orientation
would be difficult and painful, if not impossible, to reverse by psychiatric treatment).
107. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1303 (1985).
108. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1348.
109. 473 U.S. at 441 (1985).
110. Watkins Iff, 847 F.2d at 1348. Justice Stone, in a footnote to U.S. v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), coined the phrase "discrete and insular minority."
111. Id. The Watkins court arrived at this conclusion by the fact that homosexuals are a minority
and are frequently excluded from jobs, schools, churches and heterosexual social circles. Because
of these circumstances, heterosexuals generally have few opportunities to meet homosexuals.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Note, supra note 84, at 827.
115. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Security Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1370.




with the idea that legislators sensitive to public prejudice may refuse to sup-
port homosexual legislation, these beliefs give credence to the impossible posi-




The court in Watkins held that the relevant factors compelled the conclu-
sion that homosexuals did in fact constitute a suspect class.'" 8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit then determined whether the regulations could survive the applicable stan-
dard of review.
The Army's Justifications For Excluding Homosexuals
Because the court concluded that homosexuals were a suspect class, the
Ninth Circuit's final task was to subject the Army's regulations to the strict
scrutiny standard of review. The regulations could only be upheld if they were
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.' 9 The court realized
that even under strict scrutiny, courts must be more deferential in reviewing
military regulations than in reviewing civilian laws.1' °
Military and civilian life are regulated by separate systems of justice.
Although they are parallel in some ways, they are nevertheless distinct.' 2'
Civilian court power is limited in a military setting because "courts are poorly-
equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intru-
sion upon military authority might have."' 2 The court, however, may use
its power to determine if military regulations are unconstitutional. 123 Even
granting special deference to the Army's policy choices, the court rejected
many of the Army's claims because they were based on illogical private
biases.'
24
The Army first argued that it had a valid interest in maintaining discipline
and morale by avoiding hostilities between known homosexuals and other ser-
vicemen who despise homosexuality.' 25 These concerns are similar to those
voiced about women and blacks and have a very familiar ring. The armed
forces have always displayed a substantial resistance to permitting persons
outside the social mainstream to serve in their ranks.'2 6 Throughout World
War II there were rigorous debates as to whether blacks should be integrated
117. Id. See also Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713, 732-33 (1985)
(even if homosexuals do choose to participate, they may be so repellent to certain other groups
that they will be unable to bargain effectively in the political world).
118. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1349.
119. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).
120. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
121. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 721 F.2d 687, 690 (1983).
122. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 187 (1962).
123. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 721 F.2d at 690 (1983).
124. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1349.
125. Id. at 1350.
126. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 4, at 116.
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into regiments. 27 Similar contentions were set forth by the military to oppose
the integration of women into the ranks.' 28
The Army's claim was not valid. The peculiar nature of Army life always
required the fusing together of disparate personalities such as blacks and
women. The Army's vital mission had withstood these changes in gender and
racial standards. It should be able similarly to withstand any changes necessary
to operate without the regulations which courts have found offensive.'2 9
Indeed, the Army does not stand alone as the only military branch to set
out regulations it feels are in its best interests. The Department of Defense's
directive concerning enlisted administrative separations 3 ' has been adopted
with slight variations by each branch of the service.' 3
The Navy's justifications for the exclusion of homosexuals even includes
a claim that homosexuals may be less productive than their heterosexual
counterparts. 3 2 Because the military is a specialized society separate from the
civilian world, the Navy claims it is justified in its determination that homosex-
ual conduct impairs its capacity to carry out its mission.'
33
In various cases involving homosexual discrimination, job performance has
been a key issue. In all of these cases, the homosexual military personnel had
exceptional performance records. '3" Knowledge divulged from numerous court
cases and current psychiatric thought finds no basis for homosexuality as per
se disqualifying one from positions of trust and responsibility.' 3 The majority
of homosexuals who serve in the military do so with honor.' 3'
127. Id. See also Hearings on H.R. 9832, 10705, 11267, 11711, and 13720 Before the Subcom.
No. 2 of the Housed Armed Services, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
128. Id.
129. benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 976 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
130. Department of Defense Directive 1332-14, (revised and reissued in 1982), Section H, sub-
titled "Homosexuality," states:
The presence in the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual
conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosex-
ual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. The
presence of such members adversely affects the ability of the armed forces to main-
tain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among
servicemembers; to insure the integrity of the system of rank and command; to
facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of servicemembers who frequently
must live and work under close conditions, affording minimal privacy; to recruit
and retain members of the armed forces; to maintain the public acceptability of
military service; and to prevent breaches of security.
131. Army: Army Regulation 635-200, Ch. 15.
Navy: NAVMILPERSMAN 3630400
Air Force: AFR 39-10
Marine Corps: MARCORSEPMAN 6207
132. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
133. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
134. See Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1980); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
135. 632 F.2d 788 (1980).




The military's adverse policies regarding treatment of the homosexual are
steeped in history. The armed forces have a long tradition of aversion to the
presence of homosexual personnel in their ranks. 137 In practice, homosexual-
ity is routinely considered by all branches of the military as an administrative
matter, resulting in the initiating of automatic discharge procedures.' 38
However, the historical record bears confirmation that homosexual men
have played a substantial role in the military of numerous nations, particularly
as military leaders.' 39 Many 20th century societies have concluded that
homosexual soldiers should not automatically be excluded from military ser-
vice.'40
In Watkins, the Army also claimed that its ban against homosexuals is simply
a reflection of society's moral judgments. However, the court found that
widespread public distaste against homosexuals could not condone official
discrimination. '
1
Equal protection doctrine requires that ideas of morality be tempered by
the equal protection principles and that these ideas be applied evenly. Laws
that limit the focus of one's sexual proclivity to heterosexual relationships
cannot survive strict scrutiny without a compelling governmental justification.'
4
The Army's final two claims bear little relation to the questioned regula-
tions and deserve only cursory treatment. The Army argued that military
discipline will be subverted if homosexuals of different ranks develop emo-
tional relationships.' 3 Although this may be a legitimate interest, the Watkins
court determined that heterosexuals are no less likely to develop emotional
attachments than homosexuals. Yet the Army regulations failed to address
heterosexual emotional attachments.'
4 4
Finally, the Army asserted a professed concern regarding breaches of secur-
137. National Lawyers Guild Anti-Sexism Committee, Sexual Orientation and the Law, 6-3
(1987).
138. Department of Defense Directive 1332.14 (1982).
139. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 4, at 116.
140. Id. (Court concluding that Italy, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Norway, Spain,
Belgium and the Netherlands have no specific prohibitions against homosexual persons in the
armed services).
141. Watkins 1II, 847 F.2d at 1351.
142. Id. at 1352.
143. Id. The incidence of AIDS has also become a military concern. Until 1985, the various
services were free to develop informal policies about the treatment of servicemembers, with the
result that each service created its own guidelines. In 1985, however, the DOD issued a uniform
policy for the armed services which called for AIDS testing of all recruits and servicemembers.
The new policy memo set forth several reasons for the testing program. They suggest that ser-
vicemembers must be screened for the antibody to prevent transmission of the virus in battlefield
blood transfusions. However, person-to-person blood transfusions in the field are not commonly
used by the military and have not been for many years: the military blood supply is already
"protected" by AIDS testing of blood donors. See Defense Department, Military Implementa-
tion of Public Health Service Provisional Recommendations Concerning Testing Blood and Plasma
for Antibodies of HTLV-III (Mar. 13, 1985).
144. Id.
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ity."45 The Army does have a legitimate interest in excluding persons who may
be susceptible to blackmail. The court determined, however, that this prob-
lem would only arise if a homosexual is secretive about his sexual orienta-
tion. Again, Army regulations do not address this problem.'
4 6
The Department of Defense has long assumed that homosexuals are in-
herently security risks." 7 Presumably, a person who is secretive may invite
blackmail, but probably no more than the heterosexual person who engages
in secret extramarital sexual conduct.1
48
In concluding the Watkins analysis, the Ninth Circuit found the Army's
regulations violated the equal protection clause. The regulations in question
were found to be discriminatory against persons of homosexual orientation,
a suspect class. Applying the equal protection test for strict scrutiny, the court
ruled that the regulations were not necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest.'
49
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Watkin's motion
for summary judgment. The case was remanded with instructions for the
district court to rule on any unanswered claims. 5 0 The Watkins case was
reheard by the Ninth Circuit en banc in October of 1988.
If the case reaches the Supreme Court, the Court will probably overturn
the Ninth Circuit's opinion concerning homosexuals' suspect class status. A
reversal is probable because the Supreme Court has been very restrictive in
pronouncing new suspect classes.'" Until that time, however, the question
remains whether homosexuals will be recognized as a suspect class.
Reaffirming the position that homosexuals must be recognized as a suspect
class, this note supports an application of strict scrutiny analysis for
discriminatory legislation. Homosexuality is a trait which is difficult, if not
often impossible to overcome. Because of this trait, homosexuals bear the
burden of a history of discrimination and stigma. Unable to guard their own
interests, the naming of homosexuals as a suspect class would stop the
perpetuation of incorrect stereotypes, which injure a person's self-respect.'"
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 4, at 133. Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 in-
cludes fourteen criteria for finding ineligibility for clearances. Under these criteria, homosexuals
have routinely been denied clearances. Examples of criteria customarily cited include "any criminal
or dishonest conduct, or sexual perversion and any facts or circumstances which furnish reason
to believe that the applicant may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may
be likely to cause action contrary to the national interest."
148. Id.
149. Watkins III, 847 F.2d at 1352.
150. Id. at 1352-33.
151. Polyviou, supra note 38, at 239.40. Differences of opinion exist among the court about
which classifications other than race should be designated as suspect. No reasoning has been
given as to why suspect classification has been withheld from many other classifications sharing
the same characteristics as race, the model of a suspect class.




Despite the Supreme Court's position, heightened scrutiny in homosexual
discrimination cases is justified by the very factors which determine suspect-
ness. Moreover, the fight for recognition of homosexual rights is not generally
outweighed by any compelling state interest. Watkins is a prime example.
Finally, a constitutional foundation exists to allow homosexuals to be
recognized as a legitimate suspect class. Some commentators believe that since
the framers of the Constitution understood that the document would have
to survive from one generation to the next, they conceived of it being broadly
construed.'" The court is therefore justified in subjecting other statutory
classifications to strict scrutiny.
Conclusion
The Watkins holding was the correct and only decision available to the
Ninth Circuit. Army regulations concerning discharge and re-enlistment
discriminated against homosexuals on the basis of their sexual orientation.
Applying equal protection analysis, the court properly found that the class
of homosexuals met all the tests for strict scrutiny.
The fifth and fourteenth amendments call for equal protection under the
laws for all people. Under equal protection analysis, regulations and statutes
are subjected to varying standards of review. These include rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Under the strict scrutiny standard,
courts will only uphold regulations if they are justified by a compelling state
interest. This standard is normally applied to statutes which discriminate against
a suspect class.
A suspect classification allows for special treatment of a class thought to
be relatively powerless to protect its interests. Certain factors, including im-
mutability, visible characteristics, a historical disadvantage and a lack of
political representation, are considered when determining a suspect class.
The Watkins court found that the questioned regulations discriminated
against any soldier who had engaged in a homosexual act and who the Army
determined to be homosexual. The court struck down the regulations on the
basis that restriction of sexual conduct must be done evenhandedly. In analyz-
ing the relevancy of the factors, the court concluded that homosexuals do
constitute a suspect class.
The court's final duty was to see if the Army's regulations could be upheld
as necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Many of the
Army's justifications failed because they were based on irrational personal
biases. In fact, the Army had offered the same justifications for keeping women
and blacks out of their ranks. No important governmental interest was sup-
ported by the military's justifications. The Ninth Circuit found the regula-
tions unconstitutional.
If Watkins reaches the Supreme Court, the Court will probably not affirm
the Ninth Circuit's ruling. However, homosexuals are justified as a suspect
153. Polyviou, supra note 38, at 239-40. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 278 (1970).
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class because of the very concerns, such as a history of discrimination, the
Supreme Court has recognized when protecting other minority classes. Also,
no compelling state interest geared to the prevention of actual harm can
generally overcome homosexual rights.
As depicted in this case, the military's continuing policy of discrimination
against homosexual servicemembers is constantly under attack in the courts.
These civil suits, whether successful or not, have some impact on the shaping
of military policy."' The importance of the armed services to remain able
and ready for any crises cannot be underestimated. However, the military
must temper readiness with the constitutional protections which are at the
very foundation of the American way of life. Every citizen, without fear of
arbitrary punishment, should be allowed to serve and defend the U.S.' 3 One
person's sexual preference should have no bearing on willingness to volunteer
for the armed services. Strict regulations as to sexual choice may tend to
discourage rather than encourage enlistment as an alternative career option.
The status quo may also result in dwindling human resources to be used for
our nation's defense and protection.
Denise Dunnigan
154. National Lawyer's Guild Anti-Sexism Committee, Sexual Orientation and the Law, 6-3
(1987).
155. Comment, Homosexuals in the Military: They Would Rather Fight Than Switch, 18 J.
MARsHALL L. REv. 937, 966 (Spr. 1985).
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